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Linda C. McClain

INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM
In the United States, evidence of the success of legal feminism’s equality project is visible in the
constitutional commitment to equal opportunity and prohibitions against legislating based on fixed
notions about gender roles (Case 2009; United States v. Virginia 1996) and in the move toward greater
sex equality in family law and other areas of private law (McClain 2006). However, sex inequality
persists, and substantive equality remains elusive (Fineman 2001, 2009; McClain and Grossman 2009).
Social cooperation between women and men in various domains of society is assumed to be a
fundamental and necessary building block of society, but it proves hard to secure on terms of equality.
Why is sex equality so hard to achieve? One answer is that feminist quests for equality in private
and public life are a form of misguided social engineering that ignores natural sex difference. I argue
that equality within and among families should help guide family law and policy, supporting a more
inclusive, egalitarian definition of marriage and more respect for family diversity (McClain 2006).
Prominent figures in the marriage movement critique this argument for enlisting family law’s channeling
function for feminist equality goals but resisting marriage’s channeling function of securing responsible
paternal investment (Browning 2007).
This chapter examines arguments that nature and culture constrain feminist law reform.
Appeals to nature argue that brain science and evolutionary psychology find salient differences between
women and men, limiting what social engineering can achieve in fostering sex equality or reforming
family law. Appeals to culture argue that constructions of masculinity and femininity are tenacious;
challenging them threatens women’s and men’s sense of identity and causes resistance to equality.
Contemporary society may espouse a commitment to a “gender neutral society,” but men’s and
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women’s “unofficial desire” stands in the way (Mansfield 2006: 13). These contemporary claims may
signal a new form of the sameness–difference debate. As such, they invite scrutiny by legal feminists.
Often at work in discussions about sex inequality is the notion of a proper equilibrium between
the sexes that is upset when sex roles change or differences are minimized. However, even as critiques
of feminist social engineering invoke nature and culture, problems posed by nature feature as a reason
to embrace social engineering in the form of the social institution of marriage. This view of nature is
distinct from the conservative religious argument that because marriage—”the natural family”—reflects
the created order, feminist social engineering of the family is dangerous (McClain 2009).

APPEALS TO NATURE
Male and female brains and evolutionary psychology
The appeal to nature as a constraint on equality enlists brain science and evolutionary psychology,
which reportedly find salient differences between women and men, linked to different reproductive
biology and reproductive strategies. These differences limit what social engineering can achieve.
In the 1990s, a flurry of books, including Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal (1995) and David
Buss’s The Evolution of Desire (1994) introduced basic concepts of evolutionary psychology and
sociobiology, proposing that science shed light on sex difference, why men and women had different
views about the harm of rape and sexual harassment, and why they made different choices about work–
family balance (Wright 1994). Wright criticized feminist legal theorists for avoiding science. He argued
that:

[M]any of the differences between men and women are more stubborn than most feminists
would like, and complicate the quest for—even the definition of—social equality between the
sexes.
(Wright 1994: 34)
In the early twenty‐first century, brain science rivets popular attention. Once again, evolution presents
limits to social engineering and affirms sex difference. Enthusing about neuropsychiatrist Louann
Brizendine’s work in popular science, The Female Brain (2006), journalist David Brooks opines, “Once
radicals dreamed of new ways of living, but now happiness seems to consist of living in harmony with
the patterns that nature and evolution laid down long, long ago” (2006: 14).
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What are these differences and what patterns do they prescribe? Brizendine (2006: 1) declares,
“more than 99 percent of male and female genetic coding is exactly the same,” but the one percent
difference “influences every single cell in our bodies.” The inside flap of the book cover promises
neurological explanations for such sex differences as:


“A woman uses about 20,000 words per day, while a man uses about 7,000.”



“A woman knows what people are feeling, while a man can’t spot an emotion unless somebody
cries or threatens bodily harm.”



“Thoughts about sex enter a woman’s brain once every couple of days but enter a man’s brain
about once every minute.”

Brizendine turns to evolutionary theory to explain the roots of brain differences. However she is not
quietist about human nature. Biology need not be destiny if we understand how evolutionary, biological,
and cultural forces shape us (2006). Social engineering informed by biology holds promise:

Biology powerfully affects us but does not lock in our reality. We can alter that reality and use
our intelligence and determination both to celebrate and, when necessary, to change the effects
of sex hormones on brain structure, behavior, reality, creativity—and destiny.

(Brizendine 2006: 6)

What does this interplay of biology and human will suggest about social cooperation on terms of
equality? I focus on Brizendine’s use of evolutionary theory to interpret brain difference and its
implications for intimate and family life. I do not assess whether Brizendine gets the science of brain
difference right, though some scientists argue she does not (Liberman 2006; Rivers and Barnett 2007).
Scientists caution against letting “dubious science” give credibility to stereotypes and ignore “decades of
legitimate findings” about male and female similarity (Rivers and Barnett 2007). “Inflated claims of
gender differences,” they warn, have costs to children, adults, and society, as they “reify stereotypes,”
limit opportunity, and ignore that “males and females are similar on most, but not all, psychological
variables” (Hyde 2005: 581–89). These concerns echo questions about sameness, difference, and
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stereotypes long posed by feminist legal theory (Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan 1982;
Littleton 1987).

“STONE AGE” BRAINS
Contemporary females, Brizendine (2006: 42) asserts, inherit the “ancient circuitry” of “our most
successful foremothers.” Teenage girls’ drive for social connection with each other has biological and
hormonal reasons. Intimacy “activates the pleasure centers in a girl’s brain,” triggering a near‐orgasmic
“major dopamine and oxytocin rush” (37). Girls are motivated “on a molecular and a neurological level”
to “ease and even prevent social conflict” and to “maintaining the relationship at all costs” (40). These
findings sound similar to those made by Carol Gilligan and her colleagues (1990) on how girls work to
maintain connection.
Connection among females has evolutionary roots as a strategy of protection against aggressive
males, evident in studies of female mammals that develop stress responses to “tend and befriend” and
to form social groups “that promote safety and reduce distress for the self and offspring” (Brizendine
2006: 42). “These female networks” also share infant care, “information about where to find food,” and
model “maternal behavior for younger females” (42–43). Social connectedness, thus, contributes to
reproductive success (43). Today’s teen females, as they “reach” optimal fertility, undertake similar
strategies (43).
Competition is as hardwired as cooperation. Brizendine (2006: 54) attributes the “biology of
mean girls”—the harsh tactics of teen‐girl cliques—to a “survival” strategy of “sexual competition” for
the best male mates, a “biological imperative to compete for sexual attractiveness.” Success, for both
sexes, requires “some aggression,” and relevant hormone levels rise during puberty (55).
Our “Stone Age brain” also shapes mate selection, sex, and motherhood (60). Brizendine repeats
evolutionary psychology’s familiar story of the male who chases and the female who chooses, claiming
that it is “not sex stereotyping,” but “the brain architecture of love, engineered by the reproductive
winners in evolution” (59–60). Contemporary couples proceed “down an ancient pair‐bonding path,”
over which they have “little control” (60).
Brizendine draws on David Buss’s influential work (1994) on the different qualities women and
men seek in mates. Women are “less concerned with a potential husband’s visual appeal and more
interested in his material resources and social status” and prefer a slightly older partner (Brizendine
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2006: 61). “Scientists conclude” that these “universal” mate preferences are part of the “inherited
architecture of the female brain’s mate‐choice system” and are “presumed to serve a purpose” (62).
What purpose? Brizendine turns to evolutionary biology scholar Robert Trivers, who explains
female mate selection as a sound investment strategy stemming from their limited number of eggs and
greater investment than men in bearing and raising children. A man “can impregnate a woman with one
act of intercourse and walk away;” a woman is “left with nine months of pregnancy, the perils of
childbirth, months of breast feeding,” and “trying to ensure that child’s survival” (Brizendine 2006: 62).
Ancient necessities led females to seek long‐term male partners to ensure reproductive success; those
who “faced these challenges alone were less likely to have been successful in propagating their genes”
(62). Brizendine is skeptical about whether contemporary “single motherhood...will succeed,” noting
that, even today, “in some primitive cultures,” a father’s presence enhances a child’s survival rates,
making a female’s “safest bet” a long‐term male partner to offer protection and improved access to
“food, shelter and other resources” (62). In effect, women’s need for protection and provision explains
the so‐called sex contract posited by evolutionary theorists.
Men’s ancient brain circuitry, according to Buss, leads them to seek wives who are “physically
attractive, between ages twenty and forty,” and with “clear skin, bright eyes, full lips, shiny hair, and
curvy, hourglass figures” (Brizendine 2008: 63). These traits are “strong visual markers of [female]
fertility,” which offers men “the biggest reproductive payoff for their investment” (63, emphasis in
original). But “the most reproductively successful males also need to pick women who will mate only
with them,” ensuring their paternity (64).
Men’s concern with paternity supposedly explains their concern with women’s social
reputation. Brizendine explains that if a woman had sex with a man on a first date or “showed off”
about former bed partners, “his Stone Age brain might have judged that she would be unfaithful or had
a bad reputation” (64). But male “seduction and abandonment” is an old problem (64–65). Thus, male
and female reproductive strategies put them at odds. Evolution, in effect, explains the sexual double
standard. High paternal investment requires men’s certainty of paternity.
However, this model suggests that men have little to lose in random and casual sexual
encounters. Why wouldn’t they care about any potential offspring they father, if their strategy is to
maximize their reproductive success? The premise implies that if men spread around enough genes,
even if they do not personally invest in parental care for all offspring, some may survive due to the
mother’s efforts.
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Male sexual jealousy, thus, has evolutionary roots and “adaptive functions”—preventing
infidelity and ensuring paternity (Buss 1994: 125–29; Posner 1992: 97; Wright 2005: 66–72); it also has
enormous costs, evident in domestic violence (Buss 1994). Drawing on evolutionary science, Judge
Richard Posner (1992: 97, 112) argues the “biology of sex” explains men’s mate‐guarding behaviors such
as “physical sequestration of wives, disparagement of female sexuality,” and female genital mutilation.
The sexes are in conflict rather than in cooperation; these male behaviors subvert female choice (Batten
1994).

EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND MARRIAGE LAW AND POLICY
Two ways evolutionary psychology and sociobiology feature in contemporary discussions of family law
and policy are (1) arguments about why promoting “healthy marriage” and restoring a “marriage
culture” are an appropriate task for government; and (2) arguments against redefining marriage to
include same‐sex marriage.1 This embrace of social engineering is intriguing: because the social
institution of marriage is necessary to address basic problems presented by nature, law and culture
should reinforce it. Marriage is fundamental, yet fragile. Thus, marriage movement2 authors criticize
work like mine for ignoring sex difference and the purposes of marriage (Browning 2007).
These authors argue that marriage civilizes men by channeling them into socially productive
roles as fathers and husbands (McClain 2006). Marriage addresses men’s inclination toward procreating
without taking responsibility for children and women’s inclination toward procreating and rearing
children, even in the absence of adequate resources and commitment by fathers (Browning et al. 2000;
McClain 2006). Marriage is the social institution that uniquely addresses the regulation of
heterosexuality and its procreative consequences, ensuring that children have a mother and a father to
care for them (Blankenhorn 2007).
The marriage movement appeals to evolutionary psychology’s account of men’s and women’s
differential investment in offspring and conflicting reproductive strategies to explain society’s vital
interest in marriage. Marriage “closes this gap between a man’s sexual and fathering capacities”
(Coalition for Marriage, Families and Couples Education et al. 2000: 9). National Marriage Project

1

Another example is the argument against moving “beyond marriage” to recognize alterative legal forms and de‐emphasize the
conjugal marriage model.

2
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Director David Popenoe (2001) testified in a congressional hearing on marriage promotion that the
father–child bond is weaker than the mother–child bond and that men, naturally, tend to stray from
mothers and children without the commitment of marriage.
A rationale that marriage movement authors offer for limiting marriage to one man and one
woman is marriage’s role in ensuring maternal and paternal investment in children. This argument
stresses family law’s channeling function (McClain 2007; Schneider 1992) and warns against altering
marriage’s social meaning. This argument has migrated into amici briefs and some judges’ opinions in
litigation over challenges by same‐sex couples to state marriage laws.
One example is a dissent in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2003), where the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opened the door to same‐sex marriage. The Goodridge majority
rejected the state’s argument that because procreation was the central purpose of marriage excluding
same‐sex couples from marriage was rational. It identified “exclusive and permanent commitment,”
rather than procreation, as marriage’s indispensable feature (Goodridge 2003: 961). The majority argued
that the state had facilitated avenues other than marital sex for “bringing children into a family” (961–
62). Dissenting, Justice Cordy contended that “the institution of marriage has systematically provided for
the regulation of heterosexual behavior, brought order to the resulting procreation, and ensured a
stable family structure in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized” (995). Although in
contemporary society “heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child care are not necessarily
conjoined,” an “orderly society requires some mechanism for coping with the fact that sexual
intercourse commonly results in pregnancy and childbirth” (995).
The institution of marriage is, in effect, a form of social engineering that “fills a void” in nature: a
process for “creating a relationship between the man and a woman as the parents of a particular child”
(Goodridge 2003: 996). The marriage movement agrees that marriage resolves the “biologically based
sexual asymmetry” between the sexes and “the problematic of fatherhood” by meeting the mother’s
and child’s need for a mate and father and giving men a family role. It “helps create a greater equality
between parents than nature alone can sustain” (Institute for American Values 2006: 15).
Regulating the consequences of heterosexuality also features in the majority and concurring
opinions in Hernandez v. Robles (2006), where New York’s high court upheld as constitutional excluding
same‐sex couples from marriage. The majority stated that the legislature could rationally conclude that
same‐sex couples do not need marriage as much as heterosexuals do because they are less sexually
unruly, and their sexual unions do not naturally have procreative consequences. Moreover, the majority
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argued that since most children are born as a result of heterosexual relationships, which are “too often
casual or temporary,” the state could “choose to offer an inducement—marriage and its attendant
benefits—to opposite couples making a long‐term commitment to each other” (Hernandez 2006: 7).
By contrast, because same‐sex couples must deliberately plan parenthood, they—and their
children—do not need the added security and stability marriage affords because they are more likely to
have family stability (Hernandez 2006: 7). This apparent reversal of past prejudices about homosexuals
as promiscuous and irresponsible led law professor Kenji Yoshino (2006b: A19) to quip that gays and
lesbians are “too good for marriage.”
Marriage movement arguments about “conjugal” marriage’s evolutionary significance and
fragility also feature in Lewis v. Harris (2005), where the Appellate Division of New Jersey rejected the
constitutional challenge brought by several same‐sex couples.3 Judge Parrillo, concurring, wrote that the
purpose of marriage is “not to mandate procreation but to control or ameliorate its consequences” and
that the “deep logic” of gender should remain as a “necessary component of marriage” (Lewis 2005:
276–78). Quoting marriage movement scholar Daniel Cere, Parrillo contended that Goodridge’s
characterization of the essence of marriage as a permanent and exclusive commitment misses that,
historically, marriage has embraced:

the fundamental facets of [traditional] conjugal life: the fact of sexual difference; the enormous
tide of heterosexual desire in human life, the massive significance of male female bonding in
human life; the procreativity of heterosexual bonding; the unique social ecology of heterosexual
parenting which bonds children to their biological parents; and the rich genealogical nature of
heterosexual family ties.
(Lewis 2005: 276)

Marriage is “conjugal,” not just a “close personal relationship” because of pair‐bonding’s evolutionary
significance. Allowing same‐sex couples to marry would strip marriage of this richer meaning so that it
would become “non‐recognizable and unable to perform its vital function” (276).

3

The New Jersey Supreme Court overturned the appellate court (Lewis v. Harris 2006), and the legislature enacted a civil union
law in response to that ruling.
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These arguments against same‐sex marriage are not persuasive (McClain 2007). They rest on
assumptions about sameness and difference—between men and women and between opposite‐sex and
same‐sex couples. Allegedly, marriage ameliorates sex difference for the sake of children and has
“nothing to do” with sexuality that does not have natural reproductive consequences. But courts ruling
in favor of opening up civil marriage reach different conclusions about sameness and difference and
eschew such a narrow focus on marriage’s purposes. In Hernandez (2006: 32), Chief Justice Judith Kaye
dissented that the state “plainly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of children” and appropriately
links “tangible legal protections and economic benefits” to marriage. “The state’s interest in a stable
society is rationally advanced when families are established and remain intact irrespective of the gender
of the spouses” (32). Family law’s channeling function is served by expanding the reach of marriage to
same‐sex parents.
These issues also feature in the newest wave of challenges to state marriage laws: whether the
creation of a legal status alternative to marriage, such as civil unions, provides equality to same‐sex
couples. In Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health (2008), the Supreme Court of Connecticut
concluded that civil unions did not afford same‐sex couples equal protection and that their exclusion
from civil marriage lacked constitutional justification. The court determined that same‐sex couples
“share the same interest in a committed and loving relationship” and “in having a family and raising
their children in a loving and supportive environment” as opposite‐sex couples (Kerrigan 2008: 424). The
legislature recognized these “overriding similarities” when it enacted the civil union law (424), and even
though same‐sex couples “cannot engage in procreative sexual conduct,” the method of conceiving
children is an insufficient difference to negate “fundamental and overriding similarities” (424, note 19).
Notably, the state did not appeal to procreation or optimal childrearing as rationales. However,
the court noted that the procreation rationale raised by several amici did not satisfy an “exceedingly
persuasive justification requirement”: allowing same sex couples to marry “in no way undermines any
interest that the state may have in regulating procreative conduct between opposite sex couples” (477,
note 79). The court also argued that expanding marriage will not “diminish the validity or dignity of
opposite‐sex marriage,” but instead reinforce “the importance of marriage to individuals and
communities” (474). Citing to these amici’s procreative purpose argument, dissenting Justice Zarella
disagrees: “The ancient definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman has its basis in
biology, not bigotry” (Kerrigan 2008: 515–16).
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This examination of case law and of marriage movement writings illustrates how biology, sex
difference, and evolution are used to argue against expanding the definition of marriage. Because
marriage is a form of social engineering that addresses problems posed by nature, it is a fundamental
and fragile institution. I now turn to consideration of how some work in evolutionary science that more
squarely asks “the woman question” (Bartlett 1990) may aid feminist legal theorists pondering how best
to respond to these kinds of arguments. This scientific work may help with identifying different “facts”
about human nature and human society.

NATURE AND THE POLITICS OF PREHISTORY
In this chapter, I can only sketch a few ways that feminist or female‐centered work on evolutionary
science may challenge the presentation of nature and evolution in popularizing accounts and in public
policy arguments. Feminist legal theory should heed the politics of prehistory, or how certain gender
biases or stereotypes may shape the study of human origins and impose a “paleolithic glass ceiling”
(Zihlman 1997: 91). Too often, females feature only as passive participants in accounts of human origins
rather than as “agents of evolutionary change” (Hager 1997: ix). As more female scientists study human
origins, they have corrected this misconception and help in evaluating contemporary appeals to
evolution both to oppose and to support social engineering.
For example, the marriage movement stresses the pair bond, noting female and infant
dependency on male help, just as evolutionary science has asserted female dependency upon male
provisioning (Hager 1997). However, the assumption of a prehistoric pair bond is “a projection back in
time to a narrow Western view of marriage and mating, a formulation too rigid to account for the
variation that exists cross‐culturally” (Zihlman 1997: 99). The Man as Provisioner thesis assumed that to
increase the human population by having a lesser interval between births, “females reduced their
mobility, stayed near a home base, and became dependent upon males who provisioned their own
mates and offspring,” since they could be relatively certain about paternity (102). This model seems
“preoccupied with questions/anxieties about male sexuality,” at the expense of recognizing females’
roles in human evolution (Falk 1997: 115). Female scientists have noted flaws in this model, in light of
fossil evidence and studies of contemporary primate and human hunter‐gatherer societies (Zihlman
1997). The pair bond may have less to do with male provisioning than with solving the problem of male
mate competition, freeing a female to care for her offspring.
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As primatologists put females more at the center of evolutionary study, the image of female
primates has been “fleshed out to include much more than just their roles as mothers and sexual
partners of males” (Fedigan 1997: 65). Scientists have studied “the significance of female bonding
through matrilineal networks,” “female sexual assertiveness, female long‐term knowledge of the
group’s local environment, female social strategies, female cognitive skills, and female competition for
reproductive success” (65). This “female‐centered ‘world view’” among primatologists makes sense:
“many primate societies are female‐bonded; thus kin‐related females are the permanent core of the
social group” (68). These facts were “not immediately recognized by primatologists,” but are now
“facilitating a strong focus on females as well as attracting more women to the discipline” (68).
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy’s recent book, Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual
Understanding (2009: 22) proposes that the human species is more adept at cooperation than other
species because of the evolution of “cooperative breeding”: the pattern of relying on “allomothers,” or
“alloparents,” to help mothers care for their children. An “alloparent” is any non‐parent who helps
parents raise their young (22). While stories of human origins stress competition, Hrdy looks at
cooperation.
The marriage movement ponders the male–female problematic; Hrdy (2009: 159) identifies her
own “perplexing paradox”:

If men’s investment in children is so important, why hasn’t natural selection produced fathers as
single‐minded and devoted to children as [in some species]? And given that male care is so
idiosyncratically and contingently expressed, how could natural selection have favored human
mothers who invariably produced offspring beyond their means to rear alone?
(Hrdy 2009: 162)

While the marriage movement stresses the problem of fatherlessness and looks to marriage as the
solution, Hrdy looks at the way that human and nonhuman mothers enlist alloparents to assist in raising
young. “These alloparental safety nets provided the conditions in which highly variable paternal
commitment could evolve” (166). “Evolutionary interpretations of male behavior” have an “obsessive
focus” on certainty of paternity as a prerequisite to paternal investment, but there is wide variation
among men with “relatively high certainty of paternity” in terms of actually engaging in “direct care” of
infants as well as instances where men who do not share a child’s genes invest in child care (167–68).
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Evolutionary theory tends to project the nuclear family back in time. By contrast, Hrdy (2009:
166) describes “the typical or natural Pleistocene family” as “kin‐based, child‐centered, opportunistic,
mobile, and very, very flexible.” Like Brizendine, she would worry about single mothers but would look
to the vital role of alloparents and social supports, instead of assuming male protection and provision as
the best option. Indeed, “the preeminence of the man‐the‐hunter/sex‐contract paradigm, with its
accompanying stereotypes about nuclear families and maternal caregiving” have been “obstacles” to
recognizing the evolution of cooperative breeding (239–40). Removing these obstacles came in part
from the efforts of Hrdy and other sociobiologists (“many of us women”) to “expand evolutionary theory
to include selection pressures on both sexes,” including postmenopausal females (258). The
“grandmother hypothesis,” is that “new opportunities to help kin generated selection pressures favoring
longer lifespans among postmenopausal women” (255).
Assuming that hominids and early humans were patrilocal has hindered appreciation of the
extent to which early residence patterns may have been matrilocal (241–43). As starting assumptions of
“evolutionary‐minded anthropologists” about residential patterns changed, it became possible to ask
new questions about cooperative breeding and the role of alloparents (245). Studies indicate the
preeminence of grandmothers among alloparents: “having a grandmother nearby has a significant
impact on the childrearing success of younger kin” and may sometimes more greatly enhance child well‐
being than the presence of a father (253, 261). In patrilocal societies, a paternal grandmother’s
contribution may be more to her son’s success, measured in shorter intervals between births; the
presence of maternal grandmothers seems to correlate more with greater child well‐being (261–64).
Hrdy also refers to young human females’ adeptness at communication and making friends, linking it not
only to tending and befriending to obtain support, but also as a way to manufacture allomothers:
“Whether consciously or not, women seek ‘sisters’ with whom to share care of our children” (271).
On the conflict between male and female reproductive interests, Hrdy (264–65) speaks of
“patriarchal complications since the Pleistocene,” suggesting earlier practices were less patriarchal.
Concern with ensuring paternity and preserving the patriline leads to “practices detrimental to the well‐
being of mothers (and children too);” she mentions sequestering women and genital infibulations (265).
Hrdy’s hypothesis about the evolution of cooperative breeding offers a corrective to
evolutionary psychology’s emphasis on competition and on male and female strategies. The focus on an
agonistic struggle between the sexes that is bridged only through marriage detracts from a broader
focus on the range of social networks and supports that contribute to successful child rearing and well‐
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being. While the marriage movement stresses integrating sexual and parenting bonds, some feminist
legal theorists (e.g. Fineman 1995, 2004) argue that focusing on the “sexual family” diverts attention
from the family’s important intergenerational caretaking function. It takes, Hrdy paraphrases,
alloparents to raise a child. A prominent contemporary example is available: First Lady Michelle
Obama’s mother moved into the White House because of her crucial role caring for the Obama children
(Swarns 2009). Hrdy’s emphasis on the role of alloparents could support arguments made in favor of
greater family diversity—it is not the genetic tie so much as providing nurture to children that
contributes to their well‐being.

CULTURE: RESISTING EQUALITY
Culture is another reason often given for the difficulty of achieving sex equality. Women and men
reportedly worry that sex equality pushes beyond cultural limits by requiring a kind of androgyny or
sameness that denies their gendered identities. Feminist legal theorist Wendy Williams (1982) identified
the problem of cultural limits decades ago, asking feminists to think “as deeply as they can about what
we want the future of women and men to be”— “equality of the sexes” or “justice for two kinds of
beings who are fundamentally different.” In his recent book, Manliness, Harvey Mansfield (2006: 13)
argues that there is a gap between the official commitment to a gender neutral society and men’s and
women’s “unofficial desire.” I focus briefly on two examples of cultural resistance to social cooperation
on terms of sex equality: the possibility of egalitarian marriage and popular culture depictions of
heterosexual romance.
Does marital happiness require inequality? Evolutionary accounts of mate selection stress men’s
and women’s diverging criteria. More recent studies of marriage patterns suggest the growing practice
of “assortative mating”: rather than marrying up or down, well‐educated and economically resourceful
people choose to marry their peers (Paul 2006; Schwartz and Mare 2005). Meanwhile, lower‐income
men and women may cohabit rather than marry because they want a threshold level of economic
resources before they marry (Cherlin 2009).
Egalitarian or “peer” marriage is a more just form of marriage, from a feminist or liberal
perspective, than traditional marriage and more likely to be happy and stable (Schwartz 1994). Marriage
equality is a factor contributing to marriage quality, particularly for women (McClain 2006). However,
other scholars point out that marriages with a traditional gendered division of labor may also be quite
stable so long as spouses’ expectations do not change (Hetherington and Kelly 2002). Spouses may also
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accept an unequal division of labor even if they think it is unfair (Brinig and Nock 2002). Thus,
considerable disagreement exists about whether social cooperation best takes place on terms of
equality or inequality.
This debate over the desirability of egalitarian marriage surfaced recently when New York’s
governor Elliot Spitzer resigned after disclosure that he was a customer of a high‐priced prostitution
service. Spitzer apologized for his “failings” and spoke of the need to heal himself and his family as his
wife, Silda Wall Spitzer, stood by his side. The image of Spitzer’s wife by his side during this scandal was
in stark contrast to a photo of the two of them that previously appeared on the cover of the magazine,
02138: “Power Couples: See What Happens When Harvard Meets Harvard” (McCormack et al. 2007).
Love between equals can work, and even be fun and sexy, the story and accompanying photos seemed
to announce.
After the scandal, a model for happy marriage different from that of the power couple was
offered by conservative self‐help author, Dr. Laura Schlessinger. Stunning her host on the Today show,
Schlesinger laid the problem of men’s cheating at the door of any wife who failed to make her husband
feel “like a man...like a success...like her hero,” so that he was “very susceptible to the charm of some
other woman.” Schlessinger holds women “accountable” for not giving “perfectly good men” the love,
kindness, respect, and attention they need, charging that “these days, women don’t spend a lot of time
thinking about how they can give their men what they need...” (Armstrong 2008).4 In Silda Wall Spitzer’s
case, this diagnosis seems particularly inapt, given that she put her own career aside to help her
husband in his. But it does suggest cultural resistance to equality. Dr. Laura is a provocateur and her
comments drew criticism; however, she is also a popular author. Her book, The Proper Care and Feeding
of Husbands (2004: 3), indicts the women’s movement as a “core destructive influence” and advises
wives to treat their husbands with respect, reinforce them as head of the household, and celebrate
difference. Admiration and deference will yield a wife more power and happiness than direct challenge.
Mansfield (2006: 18) also speaks about admiration—“look[ing] up to someone in control”—as a proper
response to manliness.
In this view, equality is a turn‐off. Inequality is sexy. In the wake of recent infidelity scandals
involving prominent politicians, some commentators look to evolutionary science’s hypothesis that
men’s “philandering increases their reproductive success” (Porter 2009). The Spitzer scandal also played

4

Readers may view the show at www.msnbc.msn.com/id./235752221/.
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as a story of marital failure and a cautionary tale to wives about how to keep their marriages sexy and
their men from straying. However, resistance of this diagnosis may be evident from many women
finding “a catharsis” in First Lady Jenny Sanford’s “hard hitting” public statements about Governor Mark
Sanford’s confessed infidelity—and her absence from his press conference (Kaufman 2009).
Another illustration of cultural limits concerning egalitarian marriage is the continuing issue of
work–family conflict and the division of labor in the home. Laws and policies have moved us closer to a
world where mothers and fathers have equal rights and responsibilities, as a legal matter, for their
children and where, as a matter of social norms, women work outside the home and men play an active
role in nurturing children. But the division of labor in families remains a flashpoint, as is evident from the
news stories every several months about the so‐called “opt‐out revolution” where highly educated
women are choosing to stay home rather than pursue professional success. All three generations of
feminist legal theorists represented in this volume have devoted attention to these issues about care,
work, and family; my focus is on what the debate suggests about cultural limits.
One cultural limit is that while workplaces have come a long way toward recognizing that
workers may have caretaking responsibilities, cultural perceptions of male workers still differ from those
of female workers. Many men aspire to a more flexible balance between family life and work but may
rationally perceive that they will pay a higher cost in terms of seeming committed to the job if they take
advantage of employment policies designed to help parents (Jacobs and Gerson 2004).
Part of the unfinished business of feminism is that men’s lives have changed to a lesser degree
than women’s. Some feminist theorists argue that instead of pushing the state for more public policy,
wives and mothers should direct their energy toward persuading men to change (Hirschmann 2008).
Legal feminist Mary Anne Case (2001) argues for directing effort toward a redistribution of responsibility
from women to men rather than to employers or the state. Certainly, government is not the only
relevant actor when it comes to advancing sex equality. Thus, political theorist Nancy Hirschmann (2008)
raises a useful question: how can men be persuaded to change and how can women be persuaded to
insist on that change? This is a basic premise of “how to” books such as Joshua Coleman’s The Lazy
Husband: How to Get Men to Do More Parenting and Housework (2005). While Dr. Laura’s book
promises marital happiness by accepting role differentiation and resisting feminist ideology, Coleman’s
book promises to save marriages and increase marital happiness by increasing equality.
Mansfield proposes a different cultural limit: manliness. Manly men have a disdain for women’s
work, including housework. “Manliness prevents men from giving equal honor to women: this is the
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issue behind inequality in housework” (2006: 9, 13). If this is the case, then it suggests limits to feminist
social engineering. On the other hand, alternative models of men’s relationship to the home and to
family life may suggest greater success of the feminist project. The marriage movement itself attributes
women’s discontent with the household division of labor as a reason why young women are less
optimistic than young men about having a happy marriage and why women today are more willing to
exit marriages (Popenoe and Whitehead 1999). While some marriage proponents argue that a “cultural
script” of a gendered division of labor in the home is better than “endless negotiation” over roles, others
support “equal rights and responsibilities” in and outside of the home (McClain 2006: 142–51).
Equality is important to marriage quality and to addressing work–life conflict. After the death of
Betty Friedan, some commentators asked if feminism was a failure because women were choosing to
stay home rather than juggle career and family. One response was that women were making a choice,
and wasn’t feminism, after all, about women being able to make choices? No, said feminist scholar Linda
Hirshman (2005, 2006), arguing that women who were opting out were in fact making bad choices not
to be celebrated as a feminist triumph. This debate about feminism’s goals suggests one complication in
theorizing and achieving equality. Friedan’s emphasis on women getting out of the home and having
careers, while paid household workers took up the slack, risked devaluing the importance of family and
home life and suggested only one model of a good life to which women should aspire. However, when
feminists assess the issue of choice, issues like how cultural expectations for boys and girls shape their
life prospects, whether social institutions make it equally possible for women and men to pursue certain
life plans, and whether problems of unequal bargaining power constrain the exercise of choice are
appropriate concerns.
Popular culture offers examples of cultural resistance to sex equality even as it suggests
progress toward equality. Popular books and films seem to ask, what if women don’t want to have it all?
What if an equilibrium between the sexes is disturbed by sex equality? What if women and men find sex
inequality easier and sexier than equality?
Consider the contrast between the 2004 and 1975 films, The Stepford Wives, based on the best‐
selling novel by Ira Levin. The 1975 film, a cult classic, chronicled the marital tension arising from a
suburban housewife’s fledgling steps toward liberation in a photography career. Portrayed by Katherine
Ross, she wonders why all the other wives in Stepford focus so blissfully and robotically on homemaking
and pleasing their husbands sexually. She bonds with another wife who has dabbled with consciousness
raising and “women’s lib,” but they cannot interest the other wives in questioning their lives. She

16

discovers the formula for marital happiness after her friend is inexplicably transformed and just before
she meets her own fate: the men’s club to which the husbands belong kills the wives and replaces them
with robots.
In the 2004 remake, the world is different. Women have formal equality of opportunity and are
such superachievers that their husbands feel threatened. Replacing them with robots restores the
gender equilibrium. The protagonist wife (Nicole Kidman) is a ruthless entertainment executive, whose
proposed reality television show is a battle of the sexes show, with the premise that anything men can
do, women can do better. She loses her job when a humiliated husband kills his wife and tries to
assassinate her. She and her husband (Matthew Broderick) relocate to a new community where
average‐looking husbands have pleasant, compliant wives wearing floral dresses. Broderick is on the
verge of replacing his wife with a robot because, as he puts it, she is superior to him in every way. By
contrast to the original film, he cannot go through with it because, as Kidman tells him pleadingly, a
robot can’t say, “I love you,” and mean it.
In merely three decades, the battle of the sexes has shifted from husbands made uneasy by
women bristling at the constraints of the housewifely role to husbands who feel inadequate in the face
of their wives’ success. In each case, an equilibrium is upset by changes in gender relations. But a
strange plot twist in the remake complicates the question of cultural resistance: the mastermind behind
the robot scheme is a wife who killed her husband and replaced him with a robot when, hurt by his
marital betrayal, she sought to return to a simpler, more beautiful time.
My second cultural example is Helen Fielding’s wildly popular book, Bridget Jones’s Diary, a
forerunner of the “chick lit” genre. Fielding modeled her book on Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice.
Though separated by nearly two centuries, these books share a common theme: how does a young
woman laboring under gender‐based constraints negotiate the path to a happy marriage, or, at least to
a successful heterosexual relationship?
Fielding’s self‐conscious appropriation of Austen and the frequent description of Bridget Jones’s
Diary as “post‐feminist” invite feminist inquiry into how the cultural scripts of these books differ. One
trajectory is from Pride and Prejudice’s heroine, Elizabeth Bennett, an intelligent, astute critic of social
conventions, to Bridget Jones, a zany diarist of and participant‐observer in such conventions. A second is
from the wealthy, enigmatic, and proud gentleman, Mr. Darcy to the wealthy, stiff, eminent human
rights lawyer Mark Darcy.
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As an Austen fan, I find the trajectory from Elizabeth to Bridget distressing. In interviews,
Fielding has said that her novel is ironic. Bridget Jones is “really about trying too hard, trying to be too
perfect”—to have it all; it’s okay to be like Bridget, “normal” and “fun” (Penguin.com 2009). Perhaps.
But another reading may be that sex equality is a bore, and sex inequality is more fun and sexier. Bridget
seems too flawed to end up with the exemplary Mark Darcy. Awash in self‐help books, cataloging daily
her excessive intake of alcohol and cigarettes, Bridget makes foolish choice after foolish choice. She
seems a much‐diminished Elizabeth Bennett. In Pride and Prejudice, Mr. Darcy can’t help his attraction
to Elizabeth despite her class standing and embarrassing family; her criticism of him ultimately humbles
him enough to reform his pride better to reveal his basic good character. By contrast, Bridget
embarrasses herself and seems to be the only one in need of reform, even as her hapless quest for self‐
improvement amuses readers and film viewers.
The book inspired a popular film that further heightens the distance between Bridget and Mark
by contrasting her ineptitude and inappropriateness with that of his law partner and apparent girlfriend,
Natasha, his equal in education, professional achievement, and height. But Mark does not want his
equal, who summons him by snapping her fingers. He wants antic, inept, and sexy Bridget, who wears a
Playboy bunny costume to a costume party, accidentally shows her “bum” on television, and is a terrible
public speaker. Why is Mark attracted? Bridget seems to be Mark’s reward for his moral rectitude, a
burst of color and chaos enlivening his steady path toward greater success. He loves Bridget, just as she
is.
Trying to put a positive spin on Bridget, a feminist might argue that in Pride and Prejudice,
women and their families pay a high price in terms of social reputation and marriageability for choosing
the wrong man. Lydia, Elizabeth’s flirtatious younger sister, runs off with Wickham, a scoundrel to whom
Elizabeth was initially attracted, and the Bennett family avoids ruin only when Mr. Darcy forces
Wickham to marry Lydia. Bridget Jones, by contrast, fuses Elizabeth and Lydia: she gets to fall for and
have sex with Mr. Wrong and still end up with Mr. Right. Even Bridget’s mother is allowed—
temporarily—to leave her husband for the wrong man and still end up all right. In both books, the hero
rescues the heroine and her family, suggesting some men’s superior competence and power in getting
things done in the world.
Lighten up, some might say; can’t feminists take a joke? Sure, but is there a take‐home message
about not looking for love on terms of equality?
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CONCLUSION
Responding to assertions that “natural” differences or cultural imperatives limit the possibility of
equality or necessitate particular institutional forms for the family requires that feminist theorists
generate and contribute to well‐informed visions of the interplay of nature and culture. We should ask
what sorts of social cooperation are possible and valuable in the areas of sexuality, reproduction, and
parenting. Appeals to “bridging the gender divide” in ordering human society invite feminist counter‐
narratives. As such narratives theorize on the proper role of social engineering and institutions, our
feminist commitment to substantive equality should remain a guiding ideal.

19

Chapter References
Armstrong, Jenice. (March 20, 2008) “The Sleaze‐fest Continues.” Philadelphia Daily News. 35
Bartlett, Katharine T. (1990). Feminist Legal Methods. Harvard Law Review 103: 829 ‐ 888.
Batten, Mary. (1994) Sexual Strategies: How Females Choose Their Mates. New York: Jeremy P.
Tarcher/Putnam Book.
Blankenhorn, David. (2007) The Future of Marriage. New York: Encounter Books.
Brinig, Margaret and Steven Nock. (2002). “Weak Men and Disorderly Women: Divorce and the Division
of Labor,” in Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn, eds. The Law and Economics of Marriage
and Divorce. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brizendine, Louann. (2006). The Female Brain. New York: Morgan Road Books.
Brooks, David. (September 17, 2006). “Is Chemistry Destiny?” New York Times. Section 4:14.
Browning, Don S. et al. (2000). From Culture Wars to Common Ground. Louisville, KY: Westminster John
Knox Press, 2nd edition.
Browning, Don S. (2007). “Linda McClain’s The Place of Families and Contemporary Family Law: A
Critique from Critical Familism.” Emory Law Journal 56:1383‐1405.
Buss, David M. (1994). The Evolution of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating. New York: Basic Books.
Case, Mary Anne. (2009) “Feminist Fundamentalism and Constitutional Citizenship.” in Linda C. McClain
and Joanna L. Grossman, eds., Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal Citizenship.
Cambridge and NY: Cambridge University Press.
Case, Mary Anne. (2001). “How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions about Where, Why, and
How the Burden of Care for Children Should be Shifted. Chicago‐Kent Law Review 76:1753‐
1786.
Cherlin, Andrew J. (2009) The Marriage‐Go‐Round: The State of Marriage and the Family in America
Today. New York: Random House.
Coalition for Marriage et al. (2000). “The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles,
http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/marriagemovement.pdf
Coleman, Joshua. (2005). The Lazy Husband: How To Get Men to Do More Parenting and Housework.
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Falk, Dean. (1997) “Brain Evolution in Females: An Answer to Mr. Lovejoy.” Lori D. Hager, ed., Women in
Human Evolution. London and New York: Routledge.

20

Fedigan, Linda Marie. (1997) “Is Primatology a Feminist Science?” Lori D. Hager, ed., Women in Human
Evolution. London and New York: Routledge.
Fielding, Helen. (1996) Bridget Jones’s Diary. New York: Viking.
Fineman, Martha Albertson. (2009) “Equality: Still Illusive After All These Years.” in Linda C. McClain and
Joanna L. Grossman, eds., Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal Citizenship.
Cambridge and NY: Cambridge University Press.
Fineman, Martha Albertson. (2004) The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency. New York: New Press.
Fineman, Martha Albertson. (1995) The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth
Century Tragedies. NY: Routledge.
Fineman, Martha Albertson. (2001) “Why Marriage?,” Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law
9:239.
Gilligan, Carol et al., ed. (1990) Making Connections: The Relational Wolrds of Adolescent Girls at Emma
Willard School. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. (2003) 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.).
Hager, Lori D., ed. (1997). Women in Human Evolution. London and New York: Routledge.
Hernandez v. Robles. (2006) 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y.)
Hetherington, E. Mavis and John Kelly. (2002). For Better or for Worse: Divorce Reconsidered. New York:
W.W. Norton.
Hirschmann, Nancy. (2008). “Wed to the Problem? The Place of Men and State in Families.” The Good
Society 17 (1): 52‐55.
Hirshman, Linda R. (2006). Get to Work: A Manifesto for Women of the World. New York: Viking.
Hirshman, Linda. (December 2005). “Homeward Bound.” The American Prospect 16 (12):20‐26.
Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer. (2009). Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding.
Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University.
Hyde, Janet Shibley. (2005). “The Gender Similarities Hypothesis.” American Psychologist 60 (6):581‐592.
Institute for American Values et al. (2006) Marriage and the Law: A Statement of Principles. New York:
Institute for American Values.
Jacobs, Jerry A. and Kathleen Gerson. (2004) The Time Divide: Work, Family, and Gender Inequality.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

21

Kaufman, Leslie. (June 27, 2009) “Political Wife’s Hard Line Strikes Chord.” New York Times: A12
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health. (2008) 957 A.2d 407 (Connecticut).
Lewis v. Harris. (2005) 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. App. Div.)
Lewis v. Harris. (2006) 908 A.2d 196. (N.J.)
Liberman, Mark. (2006). “Neuroscience in the Service of Sexual Stereotypes.” Language Log.
http://158.130.17.5/~myl/languagelog/archives/003419.html
Littleton, Christine A. (1987). “Reconstructing Legal Equality.” California Law Review 75: 1279‐1337.
Mansfield, Harvey C. (2006). Manliness. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
McClain, Linda C. (2009). “Child, Family, State, and Gender Equality in Religious Stances and Human
Rights Instruments: A Preliminary Comparison.” Martha Albertson Fineman and Karen
Worthington, ed., What’s Right for Children? The Competing Paradigms of Religion and Human
Rights. Farnham, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd..
McClain, Linda C. and Joanna L. Grossman. (2009). Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal
Citizenship. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
McClain, Linda C. (2007). “Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channelling Function of
Family Law.” Cardozo Law Review 28:2133‐2183.
McClain, Linda C. (2006). The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility.
Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
McCormack, Lindsey et al. (2007). “Power Couples: See What Happens When Harvard Meets Harvard.”
02138, Winter 2007: 62‐78.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982). 458 U.S. 718.
Paul, Annie Murphy. (November 19, 2006) “The Real Marriage Penalty.” New York Times
(Magazine, Section 6:22).
Penguin.Com (2009). “Book Clubs/Reading Guides: Bridget Jones’s Diary/Helen Fielding.”
http://us.penguingroup.com/static/rguides/us/bridget_joness‐diary.html
Popenoe, David. (May 22, 2001). “Testimony of David Popenoe.” Hearing on Welfare and Marriage,
House Ways and Means Committee.
Popenoe, David and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead. (1999). “The State of Our Unions.”
http://www.marriage.rutgers.edu

22

Porter, Eduardo. (July 3, 2009). “Tales of Republicans, Bonobos and Adultery.” New York Times A20.
Posner, Richard A. (1992). Sex and Reason. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Rivers, Carly and Rosalind C. Barnett. (October 28, 2007). “The Difference Myth.” Boston Globe,
www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/10/28/the_difference_myth/
Schlessinger, Dr. Laura C. (2004). The Proper Care and Feeding of Husbands. New York: Harper Collins.
Schneider, Carl. (1992). “The Channelling Function of Family Law.” Hofstra Law Review 20:495‐532.
Schwartz, Christine R. And Robert D. Mare. (2005) “Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage From
1940 to 2003.” Demography 42: 621.
Schwartz, Pepper. (1994) Love Between Equals: How Peer Marriage Really Works. New York: The Free
Press.
Swarns, Rachel L. (May 4, 2009) “An In‐Law Is Finding Washington To Her Liking.” New York Times A11.
United States v. Virginia.(1996). 518 U.S. 515.
Williams, Wendy Webster. (1982) “The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism.” Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy, eds., Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in
Law and Gender. New York: Westview Press.
Wright, Robert. (November 28, 1994). “Feminists, Meet Mr. Darwin.” The New Republic, 211 (22):34‐36.
Wright, Robert. (1995). The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are: The New Science of
Evolutionary Psychology. New York: Vintage Books.
Yoshino, Kenji. (July 14, 2006). “Too Good for Marriage.” New York Times, A19.
Zihlman, Adrienne. (1997) “The Paleolithic Glass Ceiling: Women in Human Evolution.” In Lori D. Hager,
ed., Women in Human Evolution. London and New York: Routledge.

23

